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INTRODUCTION 
During the Senate’s closed confirmation hearings on President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s nomination of Charles E. Wilson, president 
of General Motors, to be secretary of defense, a senator asked Wilson 
if he would be able to make decisions as secretary of defense that 
were adverse to General Motors’ interest.1 Wilson replied that he 
would, but added he could not imagine having to make such a choice 
because “[f]or years I thought what was good for the country was 
good for General Motors and vice versa.”2 This bit of rhetorical 
bromide was reported erroneously by the press, which had been 
excluded from the closed hearing, as the arrogant manifesto of 
corporate superiority with which most of us are familiar: “What’s 
good for General Motors is good for America.”3 
In a similar fashion, Professor Sung Hui Kim has converted the 
important but benign amicus support that General Motors and sixty-
five other major American corporations gave to the University of 
Michigan in Grutter v. Bollinger4 into a hypocritical “diversity double 
standard,” because they allegedly embraced a diversity standard in 
Grutter that they would not accept for themselves.5 According to Kim, 
 
     *   © 2011 James E. Coleman, Jr. 
    **  John S. Bradway Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. SecDef Histories: Charles E. Wilson, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., www.defense.gov/ 
specials/secdef_histories/bios/wilson.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. This misquoted statement also has been erroneously attributed to President 
Calvin Coolidge, who actually said, “The chief business of the American people is 
business.” President Calvin Coolidge, Address Before the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors: The Press Under a Free Government (Jan. 17, 1925), quoted in OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 250 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 7th ed. 2009). 
 4. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 5. Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 945, 949 (2011). 
Professor Kim also references the simultaneous amicus support in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003), the case that challenged the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 
diversity policy. See Kim, supra, at 946. Grutter considered the constitutionality of the 
affirmative action program utilized by the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 311. 
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the corporate amici argued “that universities should promote 
diversity because it’s good for business,” but did not “make even a 
passing reference to the economic self-interest of universities or, for 
that matter, any of the significant costs that affirmative action 
programs generate for universities.”6 Kim argues, however, that the 
very factors the corporate amici ignored in Grutter are central to their 
assessment of the appropriateness of diversity for themselves.7 
This argument is an unfair characterization of the corporate 
amici’s position in Grutter. Those corporations argued only that a 
diverse student body such as the one that the University of Michigan 
voluntarily pursued in Grutter also serves their corporate interest. 
There is nothing in this position that can fairly be characterized as a 
diversity standard that might imperil the economic interests of elite 
universities or that the corporations were trying to force on unwilling 
universities. Professor Kim takes these corporations’ support of the 
University of Michigan’s affirmative action program out of the 
context of the Grutter litigation. In developing her thesis, she equates 
corporations’ pursuit of profits and universities’ pursuit of higher U.S. 
News & World Report (“U.S. News”) rankings to argue that the 
corporate amici pressed for a costly, inflexible standard of diversity in 
Grutter that such corporations generally would not accept for 
themselves. 
Professor Kim badly misses the mark. There is no double 
standard when corporations such as General Motors support in 
higher education voluntary diversity that they find beneficial for 
business—as the corporate amici did in Grutter—while 
simultaneously embracing corporate diversity “only to the extent that 
it furthers their economic self-interest.”8 Moreover, there is nothing 
in the briefs filed by the corporate amici to suggest that they would 
impose upon any university a diversity standard contrary to the 
university’s self-interest, which Professor Kim identifies primarily as 
“prestige” in the form of higher U.S. News rankings.9 Finally, I also 
question the validity of the two assumptions implicit in Professor 
Kim’s argument: that diversity inherently undermines a university’s 
“prestige” and that there is no credible business case for corporate 
diversity that would be consistent with a business corporation’s 
economic interest.10 
 
 6. Kim, supra note 5, at 952 (emphasis added). 
 7. Id. at 952–54. 
 8. Id. at 952–53. 
 9. Id. at 962–63. 
 10. See id. at 971. 
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I.  PROFESSOR KIM’S MANUFACTURED “DIVERSITY DOUBLE 
STANDARD” 
Professor Kim notes that “distinguished business corporations” 
filed two amicus briefs on behalf of the University of Michigan in 
Grutter that “loudly affirmed the value of educational diversity to the 
business sector.”11 These corporations, General Motors and sixty-five 
other self-described “leading American businesses” (“Sixty-five 
Leading Businesses”) argued that the racially and ethnically diverse 
student bodies that the university pursued in Grutter fit well with 
businesses’ need, “at every level of an organization,” for employees, 
officers, and directors exposed to “widely diverse people, cultures, 
ideas, and viewpoints.”12 According to Kim, these amici argued that 
the very success of American businesses in a global economy depends 
upon their ability “to recruit from a talented pool of racially and 
ethnically diverse student bodies.”13 From this, Kim concludes that 
“corporate support for educational diversity was premised on the 
claim that ‘diversity is good for business,’ ”14 which she calls the 
“business case for diversity.”15 
Professor Kim argues, however, that this “business case for 
[educational] diversity” is not good enough for American business 
itself; when it comes to “affirmative action efforts by for-profit 
business corporations” to achieve “both workplace diversity and 
board diversity,”16 these corporations support diversity “only if the 
economic benefits exceed the economic costs to the corporation 
itself.”17 Professor Kim contrasts this profit-dependent position on 
corporate diversity with what she posits as the corporate amici’s self-
 
 11. Id. at 946. 
 12. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 5–6, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Sixty-five Businesses Brief]. 
 13. Kim, supra note 5, at 947; see Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter GM Brief]; Sixty-five 
Businesses Brief, supra note 12, at 5. 
 14. Kim, supra note 5, at 947 (quoting David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently 
Unequal” to “Diversity is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity 
Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 
(2004)). 
 15. Id. (quoting David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to 
“Diversity is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the 
Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004)). 
 16. Id. at 948. 
 17. Id. 
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centered position on educational diversity, which she claims ignores 
the economic burden such a policy places on universities. 
Professor Kim acknowledges that, at least superficially, these two 
positions are not obviously inconsistent. Both positions are “forward-
looking justifications . . . [,] economic in nature,” and “grounded in 
the empirical claim that ‘diversity is good for business.’ ”18 However, 
when Professor Kim looks deeper, she finds a “diversity double 
standard.” In the case of corporate diversity, the corporate amici (or, 
perhaps more accurately, corporations like them) “will support 
diversity in the workplace [and in the board room] so long as it makes 
money.”19 And the double standard? These same corporations push 
educational diversity for elite universities “regardless of the 
university’s economic self-interest.”20 These are the sands on which 
Professor Kim’s “diversity double standard” rests. 
II.  THERE IS NO DOUBLE STANDARD INHERENT IN THE POSITION 
THAT CORPORATE AMICI TOOK IN GRUTTER AND THE POSITION 
THAT CORPORATE DIVERSITY MUST BE BUSINESS JUSTIFIED   
As a threshold matter, we must take the corporate amici’s 
arguments in Grutter in the context in which they were made. They 
were not advocating a position they wanted to impose on the 
University of Michigan. Rather, they were supporting the university’s 
voluntary position in the litigation. Moreover, their position appears 
to have been persuasive; Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion 
“seemingly endorsed various business rationales for diversity.”21 In 
context, therefore, what the corporate amici did in Grutter was good 
for the University of Michigan, based on the university’s own 
assessment of its diversity policy.22 Professor Kim mentions this but 
ignores it in her analysis. It is helpful, therefore, to note what the 
University of Michigan said about the affirmative action program to 
which the corporate amici lent their support. 
 
 18. Id. at 948–49. 
 19. Id. at 949. 
 20. Id. (second emphasis added). 
 21. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 797. 
 22. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003) (noting that the University of 
Michigan Law School “follows an official admissions policy that seeks to achieve student 
body diversity . . . [b]y enrolling a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students . . . 
to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School’s character and to the legal 
profession”); see GM Brief, supra note 13, at 2; Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 12, 
at 1. 
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In Grutter, the University of Michigan said that its “desire for a 
diverse student body is at the very core of its proper institutional 
mission.”23 This characterization of its mission is consistent with 
Justice Powell’s contention in Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke24 that “the cultivation of a diverse and vibrant academic 
environment is the most important ‘business of a university.’ ”25 For 
the success of this educational business, the University of Michigan 
argued that 
law schools need the autonomy and discretion to decide that 
teaching about the role of race in our society and legal system, 
and preparing their students to function effectively as leaders 
after graduation, are critically important aspects of their 
institutional mission.26 
It is not clear where Professor Kim finds in this position evidence 
that universities such as Michigan cannot forgo diversity when it no 
longer serves their self-interest. The University of Michigan was not 
being forced to choose among competing interests in Grutter; rather, 
it was defending its right to pursue diversity when it chose to do so. 
There was nothing in the Grutter litigation that suggested the 
university would have to forego “prestige” to pursue diversity or that 
the corporate amici implied such a requirement in their support. 
The Sixty-five Leading Businesses and General Motors 
participated in Grutter only to offer their own experiences as concrete 
evidence that the University of Michigan’s claims about the benefits 
of educational diversity were substantial; as the brief of the Sixty-five 
Leading Businesses said, “Amici attest to the validity of these claims 
through their actions.”27 They had no role in formulating any standard 
of diversity for the university; they merely supported a standard that 
the university itself advanced. Whether that standard is the same or 
different from the standard that business corporations would support 
for themselves is irrelevant. Professor Kim is comparing apples and 
oranges. 
The corporate amici pointed to their own efforts to obtain a 
diverse workforce and officer corps as the primary rationale for 
intervening into a dispute involving diversity in higher education. The 
Sixty-five Leading American Businesses described themselves as 
 
 23. Brief for Respondents at 28, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). 
 24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 25. Brief for Respondents, supra note 23, at 28 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312). 
 26. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 27. Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 12, at 8. 
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“global businesses that recruit at the University of Michigan or 
similar leading institutions of higher education.”28 Collectively, these 
corporations hire “thousands of graduates of . . . major public 
universities.”29 A diverse student body such as the one the University 
of Michigan defended in Grutter “is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and 
maintain a diverse workforce, and to employ individuals of all 
backgrounds who have been educated and trained in a diverse 
environment.”30 In pursuit of that goal, these amici asserted that they 
had invested “substantial financial and human resources to create and 
maintain a diverse workforce.”31 
The amici acknowledged the cost of educational diversity, and 
they said they also had devoted substantial resources to support 
programs and initiatives to advance racial and ethnic diversity at 
Michigan and other major universities.32 There is nothing in the brief 
filed by the sixty-five corporations to support Professor Kim’s claim 
that these corporations would force elite universities to implement 
diversity programs that were not fully in the universities’ self-interest, 
however that was defined. 
General Motors filed a separate amicus brief, making 
substantially the same arguments as the Sixty-five Leading 
Businesses. The Michigan-based company said that it “depends upon 
the University of Michigan and similarly selective academic 
institutions to prepare students for employment—to teach them the 
skills required to succeed and lead in the global marketplace.”33 
Although the brief may not have waxed eloquent about social justice, 
it argued that the “future of American business and, in some 
measure, of the American economy depends upon [universities 
having the freedom] to select racially and ethnically diverse student 
bodies.”34 The brief concluded: 
A ruling proscribing the consideration of race and ethnicity in 
admissions decisions would dramatically reduce the diversity at 
our Nation’s top institutions and thereby deprive the students 
who will become the corps of our Nation’s business elite of the 
interracial and multicultural interactions in an academic setting 
that are so integral to their acquisition of cross-cultural skills. 
 
 28. Id. at 1. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1–2. 
 33. GM Brief, supra note 13, at 1. 
 34. Id. at 2. 
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Such a ruling also would reduce racial and ethnic diversity in 
the pool of employment candidates from which the Nation’s 
businesses can draw their future leaders, impeding businesses’ 
own effort to achieve and obtain the manifold benefits of 
diversity in the managerial levels of their work forces.35 
The major flaw in Professor Kim’s argument is her assumption 
that this position intentionally ignores the economic impact of 
diversity on universities. This is a two-step process. First, Kim 
criticizes the corporate amici for focusing on the “pressing economic 
need for businesses to compete in an increasingly global economic 
environment” and sidestepping “any social justice justifications for 
diversity, whether framed in corrective justice terms or based on the 
indignities of de facto segregation.”36 Second, she concludes that the 
“strong implication” from this corporate silence in Grutter is that “it 
simply doesn’t matter whether diversity serves or disserves the 
economic self-interest of universities. The possibility that it might 
hurt the university’s bottom line doesn’t even register.”37 This is 
comparable to the journalists who were excluded from the Senate 
hearings of Charles Wilson’s nomination to be secretary of defense 
writing that Wilson told the senators only that “[w]hat’s good for 
General Motors is good for America.” Unlike those reporters, 
however, there is no factual basis in anything that the corporate amici 
actually wrote in their briefs for what Professor Kim claims is the 
“strong implication” that the corporations are indifferent to the 
economic impact of diversity on universities. 
Understandably, Professor Kim does not explain why the 
corporate amici would have discussed the economic impact of 
diversity on other interests of the University of Michigan in their 
briefs; nobody, let alone the corporate amici, discussed such 
consequences. That issue was simply not implicated in the case. 
Michigan was seeking only the autonomy and discretion to pursue 
 
 35. Id. at 2–3. 
 36. Kim, supra note 5, at 950–51. The corporate amici did not sidestep such 
arguments; rather, such arguments were irrelevant. The Supreme Court long had rejected 
such social or historic justifications for voluntary affirmative action. See City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 498–99 (1989) (holding that a state affirmative action 
program cannot be justified solely on the ground that it is a remedy to past societal 
discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“We have 
never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively 
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals [without findings of] 
constitutional or statutory violations.”). What would have been the point of pressing such 
rejected claims in Grutter? 
 37. Kim, supra note 5, at 952 (emphasis added). 
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diversity; it was not being compelled to do so against its will or 
interest. This argument, to which Professor Kim devotes a substantial 
part of her article, is an attack on a straw man. Even if she is correct 
about the economic cost of diversity to the university, so what? All 
the University of Michigan has to do to protect its economic 
interest—if it is threatened by diversity—is curtail or terminate its 
voluntary affirmative action programs. 
Professor Kim devotes major attention to what she calls the 
“economic cost” of diversity to elite universities such as the 
University of Michigan. According to Professor Kim, these costs are 
what make the so-called diversity double standard important: 
“[M]eaningful affirmative action programs that admit more than 
token numbers of underrepresented minorities (including Latinos, 
African Americans, and American Indians) generate more economic 
costs than economic benefits to universities.”38 The support for this 
damning indictment of educational diversity is superficial and 
incomplete. 
The most significant cost of educational diversity that Professor 
Kim identifies is a negative impact on the university’s “prestige,” 
which “may hamper the ability of universities to charge premium 
tuitions and attract alumni donations.”39 The current, most universal 
measure of prestige is the “institutional rankings published by U.S. 
News & World Report.”40 Based on the positive impact that a high 
ranking has on the quality of students a university is able to attract, 
and the amount of additional financial aid a university would have to 
provide to attract such students if its rankings slipped, Professor Kim 
purports to show an inverse relationship between meaningful 
diversity and U.S. News rankings.41  
Professor Kim claims empirical support for the proposition that 
“a university’s efforts at promoting racial and ethnic diversity beyond 
mere tokenism may be at cross-purposes with maintaining or 
increasing rankings.”42 The evidence on which she relies is the 
familiar literature showing that some racial and ethnic minorities 
underperform on the standardized tests on which universities heavily 
 
 38. Id. at 959 (footnotes omitted). One might argue that in assessing the costs and 
benefits of diversity for public universities, such long-term costs to society are 
appropriately considered. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“The 
diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education 
must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”). 
 39. Kim, supra note 5, at 959. 
 40. Id. at 960. 
 41. See id. at 963–974. 
 42. Id. at 963. 
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rely in admissions. These same test results are also heavily weighted 
in U.S. News rankings; therefore, the more of these underperforming 
applicants a university admits, the lower its U.S. News ranking will be. 
That conclusion assumes a more direct relationship between diversity 
and ranking than Kim’s data support; she offers no evidence that the 
pursuit of diversity in fact has undermined any university’s U.S. News 
ranking. In fact, sticking with U.S. News, one can find evidence for 
the opposite conclusion, or at least for the proposition that diversity 
and a high ranking appear to be compatible goals. 
Professor Kim mentions in passing that U.S. News also ranks 
universities and colleges on the basis of their diversity.43 This diversity 
index seeks to rank universities based on the racial and ethnic 
diversity of their student bodies. 
A university is truly diverse if there are many different ethnic 
groups enrolled on campus and those groups have around the 
same percentage of students enrolled. In other words, if a 
college has only one ethnic group that makes up the vast 
percentage of its entire student body, it’s not very diverse, even 
though it might have many other ethnic groups represented in 
small percentages.44 
Using an “ethnic diversity mathematical formula,” U.S. News has 
created a “diversity index that ranges from 0.0 (entire enrollment is 
one racial/ethnic group) to 1.0 (school’s enrollment is equally 
distributed over all racial/ethnic groups).”45 The closer a university’s 
index score is to 1.0, the more diverse it is. 
On the latest diversity index, the most diverse American 
university is Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, which has 
an index score of 0.74,46 which “means that nearly 3 out of every 4 
people you run into [at Rutgers] will be from a different ethnic 
group.”47 Only seventeen colleges have a diversity index of 0.7 or  
 
 43. Id. at 973 n.120. 
 44. Bob Morse, Which Colleges Have the Most Student Diversity?, MORSE CODE: 
INSIDE THE COLLEGE RANKINGS (Aug. 27, 2009, 2:18 PM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
blogs/college-rankings-blog/2009/08/27/which-colleges-have-the-most-student-
diversity.html.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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higher.48 Using this index as a measure, it does not obviously appear 
that more diversity has a negative impact on a school’s ranking. 
The following table sets out the diversity index for the top twenty 
universities in the country, based on U.S. News’ most recent list of top 
colleges. The average diversity index for the top eleven universities is 
0.58, compared to an average of 0.50 for the next nine. Moreover, 
within the first group of universities, there is no university with an 
index less than 0.51 (the University of Chicago). In the next tier, 
however, the lowest index is 0.38 (the University of Notre Dame). 
Among the top eleven universities, fourth-ranked Columbia 
University has an index of 0.60; fifth-ranked Stanford has an index of 
0.68, and seventh-ranked MIT has an index of 0.67, also ranking them 
among the most diverse universities in the country. 
 
Table 1: Diversity Index for Top Twenty U.S. Universities 
 
2011 U.S. News Ranking49 2011 Diversity Index50 
1. Harvard University 0.55 
2. Princeton University 0.54 
3. Yale University 0.55 
4. Columbia University 0.60 
5. Stanford University 0.68 
6. University of Pennsylvania 0.56 
7. California Institute of Technology          
7. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
0.58                 
0.67 
9. Dartmouth College                                    
9. Duke University                                         
9. University of Chicago 
0.56                 
0.58                 
0.61 
12. Northwestern University 0.51 
13. John Hopkins University                        
13. Washington University (St. Louis) 
0.55                 
0.44 
 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. National Universities Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews 
.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/national-universities-rankings (last visited Feb. 12, 
2011). 
 50. Racial Diversity: National Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/national-campus-ethnic-diver
sity (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
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15. Brown University                                    
15. Cornell University 
0.53                 
0.48 
17. Rice University                                        
17. Vanderbilt University 
0.62                 
0.44 
19. University of Notre Dame 0.38 
20. Emory University 0.57 
 
Wholly apart from whether Professor Kim is correct in her claim 
that real diversity may come at the cost of prestige (in other words, a 
higher U.S. News ranking), she fails to show how that claim is 
relevant to any issue in Grutter or how it makes the corporate amici 
hypocrites for supporting the University of Michigan’s desire to 
pursue real diversity. The choice whether to sacrifice prestige for 
diversity—if such a choice was presented—was made solely by the 
University of Michigan, which voluntarily pursued its affirmative 
action program. All that the corporate amici did was offer evidence 
that diversity in higher education served their corporate interest, 
which apparently was important to some of the Justices who decided 
Grutter. 
III.  A PROFIT-BASED STANDARD FOR CORPORATE DIVERSITY IS 
NOT INHERENTLY A BAD STANDARD 
Finally, Professor Kim does not even address the principal 
implication of her article, that there is no credible business 
justification for meaningful corporate diversity.51 The corporate amici 
would beg to differ. 
In the two briefs filed by the Sixty-five Leading Businesses and 
General Motors, the corporate amici put forth clear business 
justifications for diversity, based on the assumption that diversity in 
their workforces and among their leaders directly contributes to their 
business success, especially in the global market. The Sixty-five 
 
 51. Kim does not explicitly argue that corporate diversity has been ineffective, but she 
cites data intended to refute any suggestion that “diversity is thriving in corporate 
America.” Kim, supra note 5, at 955–56. Moreover, if she thought corporate diversity, as 
she describes it, was compatible with businesses’ economic interest, her diversity double 
standard would be irrelevant. The double standard is noteworthy only if corporate 
diversity predicated on business justification has been a failure. Kim does not produce 
empirical evidence to support that conclusion, but it is inherent in her diversity double 
standard thesis. See id. at 949 (admitting that “one could argue that it is just a different 
standard, not deserving of the more pejorative ‘double standard’ label, because the 
corporation and university are in such different circumstances”). 
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Leading Businesses wrote that “racial and ethnic diversity in 
institutions of higher education is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and 
maintain a diverse workforce, and to employ individuals of all 
backgrounds who have been educated and trained in a diverse  
environment.”52 According to these amici, “such a workforce is 
important to amici’s continued success in the global marketplace.”53 
The global importance of a diverse workforce reflects the world in 
which American businesses must operate: “[T]he increasingly global 
reach of American business, [and] the skills and training needed to 
succeed in business today demand exposure to widely diverse people, 
cultures, ideas and viewpoints.”54 As a result, “[e]mployees at every 
level of an organization must be able to work effectively with people 
who are different from themselves.”55 In sum, American corporations 
need a “workforce that is as diverse as the world around it.”56 
General Motors also based its support for diversity in higher 
education on its need for a diverse workforce that can compete in a 
global market.57 But the company also argued that diversity was 
important domestically, as the American population becomes 
increasingly diverse. As that process accelerates, the 
capacity of many businesses to recruit and retain talented 
labor—a critical resource—therefore increasingly will depend 
upon the sensitivity of their managers to interracial and 
multicultural issues. “Companies with strong records for 
developing and advancing minorities and women will find it 
easier to recruit [and retain] members of those groups.”58 
According to General Motors, workplace diversity also improves 
creativity and productivity: “The best ideas and products are created 
by teams of people who can work together without prejudice or 
discomfort.”59 Based on that principle, General Motors created 
a “walls down” work environment to foster “idea flow”—an 
interactive process of creative brainstorming unhindered by 
titles and positions. Idea flow cannot be achieved across 
 
 52. Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 12, at 1. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 6. 
 57. See GM Brief, supra note 13, at 12–17. 
 58. Id. at 15 (quoting FED. GLASS CEILING COMM’N, A SOLID INVESTMENT: 
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 4 (1995)). 
 59. Id. at 15–16. 
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barriers of racial and cultural discomfort or among team 
members who are unable to accept diverse views.60 
General Motor’s rationale for corporate diversity finds 
theoretical support in a recent article by Tristin Green.61 Professor  
Green’s thesis is that the use of race and gender to organize how 
employees, managers, and directors work and who does the work also 
promotes nondiscrimination when employment decisions are “part of 
an employer’s broader integrative effort, an effort comprised of 
various structural reforms that are likely to foster functional 
integration and reduce workplace discrimination.”62 This argument is 
very similar to the University of Michigan’s rationale for diversity in 
higher education: people who work and learn together as peers are 
less likely to be divided by race and gender in their daily activities and 
are less likely to make decisions based on race and gender or to act on 
racial or sexual stereotypes.63 Indeed, that also appears to be the 
rationale for General Motors’ “walls down” work environment. 
It is not easy to achieve meaningful diversity in higher education 
or corporate America. Like the University of Michigan in Grutter, 
however, the corporate amici argued that diversity was critical to their 
core mission, not an ancillary luxury. Kim assumes that is not true. 
Rather, she implies—as she argues in the case of diversity in higher 
education—that meaningful diversity can be achieved only at the 
expense of corporate profitability. But Kim fails to make that case; 
consequently, her claim of a diversity double standard lacks traction. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Kim’s claim that American corporations such as those 
that supported the University of Michigan in Grutter v. Bollinger 
were endorsing a standard of diversity that they would not support 
for themselves is an unfair characterization of the corporate amici’s 
position in Grutter. They did not independently advance any standard 
for diversity in higher education. Instead, they offered their own 
business experiences in support of the standard of voluntary diversity 
that the University of Michigan had adopted. It is naive to think that 
universities will pursue diversity when it is not in their interest to do 
so, just as it is naive to expect businesses to pursue diversity “ ‘for its 
 
 60. Id. at 16. 
 61. Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work: “Diversity,” Discrimination, 
and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 585, 585 (2010).  
 62. Id. at 591. 
 63. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 23, at 22–26.  
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own sake,’ ”64 whatever that implies. Professor Kim seems to have no 
faith that diversity and a high U.S. News ranking can coexist or that 
workplace diversity and profits can coexist. But, as General Motors 
actually argued in its brief in Grutter, diversity that is good for the 
University of Michigan is good for General Motors, and vice versa. 
 
 64. Kim, supra note 5, at 948 (quoting CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE 
PATTERSON, CONFERENCE BD., BOARD DIVERSITY IN U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST 
PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF CORPORATE BOARDS 7 (1999)).  
